Summary of Amendment LCPR02-017.

Amendment LCPR02-017 amends Minnesota Statutes, Sections 354.05, Subdivision 38, and 354.44, Subdivision 6, the Teachers Retirement Association (TRA) formula retirement program provisions, by establishing age 65 as the normal retirement age for post-June 30, 1989, hirees and the restriction on the "Rule of 90" early normal retirement age and benefit tier to pre-July 1, 1989, hirees.

1. Defined Contribution or Defined Benefit (Formula) Programs.

Retirement plans can be characterized as either defined benefit programs or defined contribution programs. The difference between the two programs lies in which of two potential variables is fixed and which is left in flux. When one potential variable is fixed or made predeterminable, the other potential variable is automatically left in flux. The potential variables are the level of the benefits and the level of contributions.

In a defined contribution retirement plan, the level of contributions, or the amount of member and/or employer funding is specified or fixed in some manner, making the level of eventual benefits and/or their duration the variable factor. Most commonly, in a defined contribution plan, the funding of the plan is specified as a percentage of the covered payroll of plan members. Those contributions, allocated to individual accounts and frequently invested based on individual selection, along with any investment return obtained, constitute the benefit available to the plan member upon termination of employment or retirement. Most commonly, the individual account balance is payable in a lump sum upon the termination of plan coverage or is available to be transferred to an insurance company for the purchase of a retirement annuity. Some retirement plans that generally are classified as defined contribution plans permit the individual account balance amount to be converted into a retirement annuity within the retirement plan at a specified rate, although the assumption of that retirement annuity mortality risk actually defines the post-retirement benefit amount and subjects the retirement plan to potential future mortality and investment return experience losses and a chance for an unfunded actuarial accrued liability, akin to a defined benefit plan.

In a defined benefit retirement plan, the level of benefits at the time of retirement or after retirement is specified or fixed in some manner, making the level of contributions or the amount of funding from period to period the variable factor. Most commonly, in a defined benefit plan, the retirement benefit is specified as a percentage of the final salary or of the final average salary per year of credited service rendered. Thus, the plan tracks and awards allowable service credit and salary credit and amasses a liability for the service and salary credit rendered to date that requires the periodic calculation and assessment by an actuary. The resulting actuarial valuation report both assesses the amount of actuarial accrued liability that the retirement plan has amassed to date and the amount of total contributions needed for the future plan year or plan years. Most commonly, in defined benefit plans, any lump sum amount is limited to a pre-retirement employment termination member contribution refund, with the regular retirement benefit only payable as a retirement annuity. Generally, a regular retirement annuity has optional equivalent value forms that open for election by the plan member. Retirement plans that are defined benefit plans can take on defined contribution retirement plan aspects, such as determining post-retirement adjustment amounts from the amount of investment gain in whole or in part generated by the plan.

In Minnesota, public pension plans by both number and membership are predominantly defined benefit pension plans. The following sets forth a listing of defined benefit Minnesota public pension plans and of defined contribution Minnesota public pension plans:

 

Defined Benefit Plans

Defined Contribution Plans

General State Employee Retirement Plan of the Minnesota State Retirement System (MSRS-General) Correctional Employees Retirement Plan (MSRS-Correctional) MSRS Military Affairs Department Retirement Plan MSRS Transportation Department Pilots Retirement Plan MSRS Fire Marshal Department Employees Retirement Plan State Patrol Retirement Plan Elective State Officers Retirement Plan Legislators Retirement Plan Judges Retirement Plan General Employees Retirement Plan of the Public Employees Retirement Association (PERA-General) Public Employees Police and Fire Retirement Plan (PERA-P&F) PERA Local Government Correctional Services Retirement Plan (PERA-Correctional) Teachers Retirement Association (TRA) Duluth Teachers Retirement Fund Association (DTRFA) Minneapolis Teachers Retirement Fund Association (MTRFA) St. Paul Teachers Retirement Fund Association (StPTRFA) Minneapolis Employees Retirement Fund (MERF) Local Police Relief Associations (two associations) Local Paid Fire Relief Associations (three associations) Volunteer Firefighter Relief Associations (approximately 625 associations) University of Minnesota Faculty Supplemental Plan

MSRS Unclassified State Employees Retirement Program (MSRS-Unclassified) PERA Defined Contribution Retirement Plan Individual Retirement Account Plan Minnesota State Colleges and Universities System Faculty Supplemental Retirement Plan Volunteer Firefighters Relief Associations (approximately 75 associations) Ambulance Personnel Longevity Plan Hennepin County Supplemental Retirement Plan University of Minnesota Faculty Retirement Plan Public Employee Supplemental Thrift Plans through State Deferred Compensation Plan or selected Tax Sheltered Annuity programs Housing and Redevelopment Agency Retirement Plans Pre-1971 School District Supplemental Retirement Plans (eight plans)

2. Normal and Early Normal Retirement Ages in Defined Benefit Public Pension Plans.

The historic reason for creating and maintaining pension plans, in the private sector or the public sector, was to augment an employer's personnel and compensation system by assisting in the recruitment of new qualified employees, the retention of existing qualified employees, and the systematic outtransitioning of existing employees at the conclusion of their normally expected working careers. The pension system does this by providing retirement annuities (and frequently other casualty or ancillary benefit coverage) that are deemed adequate in view of both the employer and the employees and that are deemed affordable by the employer. This traditional pension plan purpose apparently underlies the development of public pension plans in Minnesota, although it never has clearly been articulated in law.

The systematic outtransitioning of existing employees at the conclusion of their normally expected working careers is the basis for setting normal retirement ages. The Commission’s

Principles of Pension Policy indicate that the normal retirement age of Minnesota public pension plans should be set in accord with the employability limits of the average public employee, and indicate that the normal retirement age generally should differentiate between general public employees and set at an earlier age for protective and public safety employees.

Age 65 has come to be the traditional age at which many employees are expected to retire. It is, however, unclear why this age has become the regularly expected retirement age for Social Security and for many public retirement plans. Age 65 does not appear to represent an empirically determined conclusion about when most employees retire from the experience of employees before the creation of Social Security and the significant expansion of employment-based pension coverage in the 1930's. Before the 1930's, retirement for most people appears to have been a function of a physical inability to continue in employment, at whatever age that occurred. Until recent decades, the most impoverished sector of the population was older folks. The age 65 normal retirement age is frequently ascribed to Chancellor Otto Von Bismark of Germany, who is reported to have set age 65 as the normal retirement age for the retirement coverage provided to the Prussian army.

Since the 1960's, in both larger corporate pension plans and public employee pension plans, the trend has been to institute normal retirement ages earlier than age 65. In the counter direction, based on considerations of lengthening expected lifespan and of the related cost of providing benefits for ever-lengthening retirement periods, Social Security has instituted a later full benefit retirement age, as follows:

Social Security

The Minnesota public pension plans currently do not uniformly reflect the age 65 normal retirement age preference expressed in the 1980 Principles. The following compares the normal retirement ages applicable to the various Minnesota public pension plans:

The age 62 with 30 years of service and the "Rule of 90" provisions are early normal retirement age provisions, where a benefit unreduced for early retirement is provided at an age before the generally applicable normal retirement age. The age 62 with 30 years of service early normal retirement age provision was added to the statewide general employee retirement plans in 1973 as the first generally applicable early normal retirement age provision. The "Rule of 90" early normal retirement age provision was enacted for the General Employees Retirement Plan of the Public Employees Retirement Association (PERA-General) in 1982 (Laws 1982, Chapter 519, Section 2). In 1989 (Laws 1989, Chapter 319, Article 13), the "Rule of 90" provision was extended to the General State Employees Retirement Plan of the Minnesota State Retirement System (MSRS-General), the Teachers Retirement Association (TRA), and the coordinated programs of the first class city teachers retirement fund associations, applicable to only pre-July 1, 1989, hirees. That restriction was also made applicable to PERA-General.

3. TRA Retirement Programs and Tiers

The Teachers Retirement Association (TRA) was created in 1935, to replace an earlier statewide teacher retirement program that was created in 1915 and that went bankrupt during the Great Depression. Initially, TRA provided a money purchase retirement annuity as its only retirement benefit. A money purchase benefit is a defined contribution benefit, meaning that the benefit is determined by the amount of contributions that were accumulated and the investment income earned on those amassed contributions. The other two statewide pension plans, the General State Employees Retirement Plan of the Minnesota State Retirement System (MSRS-General) and the Public Employees Retirement Association (PERA) were defined benefit plans from their inceptions, 1929 and 1931 respectively.

In 1969, in response to complaints from the teacher unions and others about the inadequacy of TRA retirement benefits, the Legislature assembled three alternative benefit programs. These alternative benefit programs were the Improved Money Purchase Program, to replace the prior money purchase program, the Career Average Salary Formula Program, to parallel the MSRS-General and PERA defined benefit plans, and the Variable Annuity Program, another defined contribution program that was invested largely or wholly in equity (stock) investments. TRA members were provided an opportunity to elect between the three programs in 1969, with a deadline of 1973, and were placed in the Improved Money Purchase Program until they elected differently. Subsequent events, principally the 1973 shift to a final average salary defined benefit plan from the career average salary defined benefit plan and the mid-1970s recession, decline in the stock market, and inflation, made the Formula Program the optimal TRA benefit plan and the Improved Money Purchase Program and the Variable Annuity Program were eventually folded in the Formula Program, with the TRA members who never made a benefit program election under the 1969 law retaining rights to an Improved Money Purchase Program benefit calculation if that produces a larger benefit. This right is the Improved Money Purchase Program savings clause and applies only to TRA members who taught during the 1968-1969 school year. In 1989, after having been placed on a phase-out basis, the Variable Annuity Program was eliminated and the assets of the Variable Annuity Fund credited to the Teachers Retirement Fund.

Also, in 1989, the TRA formula benefit program was broken into tiers. The tiers are the "Rule of 90" tier and the "Level Benefit" tier. The "Rule of 90" tier and the "Level Benefit" tier compare as follows:

 

	Rule of 90	Level Benefit
Normal Retirement
Eligibility:	Age 65 and three years of allowable service. Age 62 and 30 years of allowable service. Rule of 90, where the sum of age and allowable service equals or exceeds 90. Proportionate requirement annuity is available at age 65 and one year of allowable service.	The greater of age 65 or the age eligible for full Social Security retirement benefits (but not to exceed age 66) and three years of allowable service. Proportionate retirement annuity is available at normal retirement age and one year of allowable service.
Retirement Amount:	1.2% of average salary for each of the first 10 years of allowable service and 1.7% of average salary for each subsequent year.	1.7% of average salary for each year of allowable service.
Early Reduced Retirement
Eligibility:	Age 55 and three years of allowable service. Any age with 30 years of allowable service.	Age 55 with three years of allowable service.
Retirement Amount:	The greater of 1.2% of average salary for each of the first 10 years of allowable service and 1.7% of average salary for each subsequent year with reduction of 0.25% for each month the member is under age 65 at time of retirement (age 62 if 30 years of allowable service). No reduction if age plus years of allowable service totals 90;	1.7% of average salary for each year of allowable service assuming augmentation to age eligible for full Social Security retirement benefits at 3% per year and actuarial reduction for each month the member is under the full Social Security benefit retirement age but not to exceed age 66.
	OR
	1.7% of average salary for each year of allowable service assuming augmentation to age 65 at 3% per year and actuarial reduction for each month the member is under age 65.

TRA members hired before July 1, 1989, have the option to receive the greater of their "Rule of 90" tier benefit or the "Level Benefit" tier benefit. TRA members hired after June 30, 1989, only have the "Level Benefit" tier benefit.

Amendment LCPR02-017 extends the "Rule of 90" benefit tier eligibility and benefits to members of the Teachers Retirement Association (TRA) first employed after June 30, 1989. The potential benefit improvement raises several pension and related public policy issues that merit Commission consideration, as follows:

1. Current Actuarial Condition of TRA. The policy issue is the fluidity of the actuarial condition of the Teachers Retirement Association (TRA) in light of the actuarial assumption change recommendation pending before the Legislative Commission on Pensions and Retirement and the recent decline in TRA asset market values during the recent economic troubles. The consulting actuary retained by the Commission, Thomas K. Custis, FSA, of Milliman USA, is recommending several actuarial assumption changes for TRA, the effect of which, if they had been in place on July 1, 2001, would be to reduce the current TRA contribution sufficiency. The following summarizes the July 1, 2001, TRA actuarial valuation, compares it with the July 1, 2002, TRA actuarial valuation, summarizes the funded condition and funding impact of the proposed TRA actuarial assumption changes, and summarizes the impact on TRA of the Governor’s recent budget recommendations:

Teachers Retirement Association (TRA)

	July 1, 2000 Valuation Results		July 1, 2001 Valuation Reports		Actuarial Assumption Change Impact Estimate		Effect of the Governor's Budget Recommendations
Membership
Active Members		70,508		71,097		71,097		71,097
Service Retirees		29,525		31,169		31,169		31,169
Disabilitants		509		518		518		518
Survivors		1,912		2,070		2,070		2,070
Deferred Retirees		7,375		7,959		7,959		7,959
Nonvested Former Members		17,833		19,344		19,344		19,344
Total Membership		127,662		132,157		132,157		132,157
Funded Status
Accrued Liability		$14,802,441,000		$15,903,984,000		$15,824,520,000		$15,824,520,000
Current Assets		$15,573,151,000		$16,834,024,000		$16,834,024,000		$16,834,024,000
Unfunded Accrued Liability		($770,710,000)		($930,040,000)		($1,009,504,000)		($1,009,504,000)
Funding Ratio	105.21%		105.85%		106.38%		106.38%
Financing Requirements
Covered Payroll		$2,813,696,000		$2,937,962,000		$2,937,962,000		$2,937,962,000
Benefits Payable		$755,036,000		$861,788,000		$861,788,000		$861,788,000
Normal Cost	9.09%	$255,746,000	9.09%	$267,166,000	8.68%	$255,015,000	8.68%	$255,015,000
Administrative Expenses	0.30%	$8,441,000	0.46%	$13,515,000	0.46%	$13,515,000	0.46%	$13,515,000
Normal Cost & Expense	9.39%	$264,187,000	9.55%	$280,681,000	9.14%	$268,530,000	9.14%	$268,530,000
Normal Cost & Expense	9.39%	$264,187,000	9.55%	$280,681,000	9.14%	$268,530,000	9.14%	$268,530,000
Amortization	(1.47%)	($41,361,000)	(1.70%)	($49,945,000)	(1.85%)	($54,352,000)	(1.85%)	($54,352,000)
Total Requirements	7.92%	$222,826,000	7.85%	$230,736,000	7.29%	$214,178,000	7.29%	$214,178,000
Employee Contributions	5.00%	$140,710,000	5.00%	$146,914,000	5.00%	$146,914,000	4.535%	$133,237,000
Employer Contributions	5.00%	$140,710,000	5.00%	$146,914,000	5.00%	$146,914,000	4.535%	$133,237,000
Employer Add'l Cont.	0.00%	$0	0.00%	$0	0.00%	$0	0.00%	$0
Direct State Funding	0.00%	$0	0.00%	$0	0.00%	$0	0.00%	$0
Other Govt. Funding	0.00%	$0	0.00%	$0	0.00%	$0	0.00%	$0
Administrative Assessment	0.00%	$0	0.00%	$0	0.00%	$0	0.00%	$0
Total Contributions	10.00%	$281,420,000	10.00%	$293,828,000	10.00%	$293,828,000	9.07%	$266,474,000
Total Requirements	7.92%	$222,826,000	7.85%	$230,736,000	7.29%	$214,178,000	7.29%	$214,178,000
Total Contributions	10.00%	$281,420,000	10.00%	$293,828,000	10.00%	$293,828,000	9.07%	$266,474,000
Deficiency (Surplus)	(2.08%)	($58,594,000)	(2.15%)	($63,092,000)	(2.71%)	($79,650,000)	(1.78%)	($52,296,000)

The current value of assets, reflecting an actuarial smoothing technique adopted in 1999, indicates that assets have a greater value than their July 1, 2001, market value, since portions of past unrecognized investment gains continue to be incorporated into the smoothing process and portions of recent unrecognized investment losses remain to be incorporated into the smoothing process. The following compares the current TRA market and book values of assets with its actuarial value of assets:

	TRA
Market Value of Assets 7/1/2002	$16,164,371,000
Book/Cost Value of Assets 7/1/2002	$16,609,895,000
Actuarial Value of Assets 7/1/2002	$16,834,024,000

Additional investment losses, related to the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorism events and other economic weaknesses, have yet to be incorporated into these results.

2. Actuarial Cost of the Potential TRA Benefit Increase. The policy issue is the actuarial cost estimated to be produced in TRA by the potential benefit increase. Milliman USA has been requested to prepare the estimate. A summary of the Milliman USA actuarial cost estimate is attached.
   

3. Affordability of Benefit Increase. The policy issue is the affordability of the potential benefit increase. The policy issue is a corollary to the issue of the actuarial cost of the proposed benefit increase. No additional funding is provided for TRA for the benefit increase under the potential amendment, thereby funding the benefit increase within the confines of the current financing of TRA.
   

4. Funding the Benefit Increase from a Member Contribution Increase. The policy issue is the appropriateness of funding any potential TRA benefit increases in whole or in part from an increase in member contributions. The question of the source of funding for a benefit increase is a natural outgrowth of the issue of the affordability of a benefit increase. If TRA members desire a benefit improvement and provide the funding for that benefit improvement, the benefit increase is more likely to be affordable. Although TRA has a current contribution sufficiency and that sufficiency is strengthened slightly by the package of actuarial assumption changes recommended by the consulting actuary retained by the Commission, Milliman USA, TRA has testified before the State Government, Economic Development, and the Judiciary Budget Division of the Senate Finance Committee that the current investment downturn threatens the apparent fiscal solvency of TRA sufficiently to argue against the TRA contribution rate reduction that was part of the Governor’s supplemental budget balancing recommendations. If the Commission desires to require that TRA members fund a portion or the entirety of the benefit increase, amendment LCPR02-019 would be the vehicle to do so.
   

5. Uniformity Considerations. The policy issue is the lack of uniformity between teacher pension plans or between general employee pension plans if TRA is granted an extension of the "Rule of 90" early normal retirement eligibility and benefit tier to post-June 30, 1989, hirees. With the primary exception of post-retirement adjustment mechanisms, the coordinated programs of the four Minnesota teacher retirement plans (TRA, the Duluth Teachers Retirement Fund Association (DTRFA), the Minneapolis Teachers Retirement Fund Association (MTRFA), and the St. Paul Teachers Retirement Fund Association (StPTRFA)) are virtually identical. Similarly, following the 1997 benefit increases, there is substantial uniformity between the various general employee benefit programs (the four teacher retirement plans, the General State Employees Retirement Plan of the Minnesota State Retirement System (MSRS-General) and the General Employees Retirement Plan of the Public Employees Retirement Association (PERA-General). The 1997 package of benefit increases was argued by its proponents as being necessary to achieve uniformity among the various Minnesota public retirement plans. Benefit uniformity became the state goal of the 1997 legislation to such an extent that it functioned as the shorthand title for the legislation as it progressed. For all of these plans, the "Rule of 90" tier is on a phase-out basis, and is currently applicable to pre-July 1, 1989, hirees only. An extension to post-June 30, 1989, hirees for a single plan, TRA, would be an initial step to reverse that recently achieved uniformity. However, there are significant funding problems in MTRFA, StPTRFA, and PERA-General that would need to be resolved to allow for a general extension of the "Rule of 90" tier. If the Commission does desire to extend the benefit increase to all general employee retirement plans, amendment LCPR02-022 would provide the Commission with the necessary vehicle.
   

6. Appropriateness of Encouraging Early or Earlier Normal Retirement. The policy issue is the appropriateness of increasing the "Rule of 90" benefit tier, thereby encouraging early or earlier normal retirement. A shortage of teachers in Minnesota has either already occurred or is projected for the near future, largely because of the early retirement of teachers since the passage of the temporary "Rule of 85" early normal retirement window in 1993 and since the enactment of the pre-1989 hiree "Rule of 90" early normal retirement tier in 1989. In the face of that actual, perceived, or projected teacher shortage, the enactment of proposed legislation that would encourage more early retirements by teachers would be ill advised. One of the problems with this early normal retirement program extension is its lack of targeting, making it a blunt tool when the public school personnel system undoubtedly needs a more refined approach. The "Rule of 90" early normal retirement tier is a benefit extended to pension plan members, not a tool provided to public school managers. Minnesota, according to 1999 studies by the University of Minnesota College of Education and Human Development and by the State Department of Children, Families, and Learning, has specific teacher shortages in special education, mathematics, science, vocational education, and industrial technology education. Under the blunt tool of the "Rule of 90," teachers in those fields can elect to retire early, further exacerbating this problem and compounding the difficulty of public school management to fill positions with qualified teachers. A resolution that is better than the "Rule of 90" would be one that allows public school managers to encourage retirement among senior teachers in subject areas where there is no shortage, while providing additional retention incentives for teachers in subject areas in which shortages have occurred or are predicted to occur. Also, while education critics are promoting the use of senior teachers to mentor new teachers, attempting to slow the high employment turnover rate in younger, less senior teachers, the "Rule of 90" early normal retirement tier, combined with district early retirement incentive programs bargained in the late 1970’s and not eliminated, works to significantly reduce the number of potential teacher-mentors. Before the Commission rewards the demands or requests of TRA members for an extended "Rule of 90," it may wish to solicit input from representatives of public school management and from the Senate and House Education Committees to attempt to formulate a consistent public school personnel compensation and benefits policy.
   

7. Appropriateness of Reversing the "Rule of 90" Phase-Out. The policy issue is the appropriateness of reversing the 1989 phase-out of the "Rule of 90" early normal retirement benefit tier. The "Rule of 90" was initially sought by and enacted for the General Employees Retirement Plan of the Public Employees Retirement Association (PERA-General) and was implemented on an ongoing basis, meaning that it was not subject to any termination date. In 1989, when the "Rule of 90" was extended to PERA-General, Teachers Retirement Association (TRA), and the first class city teacher retirement fund associations, the proposal was controversial within the Commission and was not ultimately recommended by the Commission. House members of the Commission, led by Representative Wayne Simoneau, pursued the 1989 benefit increases during that session, including the "Rule of 90" extension, while some Senate members of the Commission, led by Senator Donald M. Moe, pursued the level benefit formula approach. When the 1989 benefit increases were processed by the House Governmental Operations Committee, an attempt at a compromise between the two approaches was fashioned by the benefit increase proposal’s sponsors, with the creation of a "Rule of 90" tier based on the then-existing benefit accrual formula percentage rates, applicable only to existing plan members and to phase out by being limited to pre-July 1, 1989 hirees, and the creation of a "Level Benefit" tier, applicable to existing members if it produces a larger benefit level and to future members. The normal retirement age was also indexed to the Social Security full benefit age (increasing to age 67) for post-June 30, 1989, hirees. The benefit increase package, combined with much of the proposed legislation that had been recommended by the Commission, was amended to a Duluth teacher salary change bill on the House floor and the amended Senate File was then concurred to by the Senate after an extended floor debate. The age 67 component of the 1989 benefit increase package has already been disrupted, with an age 66 cap on the normal retirement age enacted in 1997. The proposed reversal of the phase-out of the "Rule of 90" benefit tier for TRA would constitute a further erosion of the policy that was imposed on the Commission in 1989. The 1989 phase-out of the "Rule of 90" tier may have been a pragmatic device to gain the early retirement program in the face of significant opposition in 1989, without any real conviction for it on the part of the 1989 benefit increase proponents, but the policy of a phase-out of this broad-based, early retirement program has been enacted, has continued for a considerable period (12+ years), and should only be overturned after due deliberation by the Commission.
   

8. Consequences of Service Credit-Related Pension Benefit Provisions. The policy issue is impact that pension benefit provisions based wholly or largely on the acquisition of lengthy service credit, such as the "Rule of 90" early normal retirement age eligibility and benefit tier, will have on other aspects of pension benefit coverage. Since the passage of the "Rule of 90" tier in 1989, the Commission has been faced with ever-increasing volumes of service credit purchase requests, including requests from post-June 30, 1989, hirees to purchase salary credit before July 1, 1989, solely in order to gain applicability of the "Rule of 90" tier. Additionally, early retirement programs that prompt public employees to leave public employment before the actual limit to their employability, like the "Rule of 90" tier, have led to the Commission initially relaxing reemployed annuitant earnings limitations and, in 2000, virtually eliminating them based on demands from public pension plan annuitants who desired or felt required to return to active employment. Also, early retirement programs such as the "Rule of 90" tier have resulted in pressures from public pension plan annuitants to gain access to post-retirement health insurance coverage and to have that coverage subsidized by the former public employer. With the expected reductions in the amount of post-retirement adjustments from the Minnesota Post-Retirement Investment Fund because of investment market declines, complaints about the cost of post-retirement health coverage and the inadequacy of post-retirement adjustments can be expected. While a phase-out of the "Rule of 90" is a very modest correction away from those adverse practical impacts of an early retirement trend, the proposed extension of the "Rule of 90" to all current and future members will never gain a correction in these impacts.